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THE JAPAN-UNITED STATES SALMON CONFLICT
RALPH W. JOHNSON0
INTRODUCTION
The United States, Canada, and Japan signed the International
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
[hereinafter cited as Tripartite Treaty] on May 9, 1952,1 11 days after
the effective date of the Japanese Peace Treaty. This fisheries Treaty
became effective June 12, 1953. It initiated the "abstention" principle
whereby Japan agreed to abstain from fishing stocks of North Ameri-
can spawned salmon when the Commission, created in the treaty, was
satisfied that the United States and Canada were taking the "maximum
sustainable yield"' of those stocks, when it was demonstrated that
United States and Canadian fishermen were being regulated by law
toward the production of the maximum sustainable yield, and when
continuing scientific studies were being carried on to assure such full
utilization. In application of this concept the Japanese, in the annex
to the treaty, specifically agreed to abstain from fishing for North
American spawned salmon east of a line in the Bering Sea located for
the most part at longitude 175' W.
The treaty had a mandatory life of 10 years, which elapsed on June
12, 1963, and is now terminable on one year written notice by any of
the three parties.3 Criticism from both sides of the Pacific has brought
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. Member of Washington and Oregon
State Bar Associations. B.S., University of Oregon, 1947; LL.B., University of
Oregon, 1949; Diploma, Hague Academy of International Law Center for Studies and
Research, 1961. Ford Foundation Grantee, 10 months, 1961-1962, research on interna-
tional river law.
The author is greatly indebted to the Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C.,
for its generous financial support of this research. Credit is due Mr. Lynn Sutcliffe,
student at the Law School for his competent research assistance throughout this
writing. Research on this paper was assisted by a visit to Japan in 1965 when the
author was able to consult with Japanese Government officials, industry leaders and
academic experts.
'International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean, May 9, 1952 [1953] 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S., No. 2786 [hereinafter cited as
Tripartite Treaty].
- The goal of maximum sustainable yield is also set forth in the preamble of the
Tripartite Treaty, where it is said that "it will best serve the common interest of
mankind, as well as the interests of the Contracting Parties, to ensure the maximum
sustained productivity of the fishery resources of the North Pacific Ocean ... " A
considerable body of literature has grown up over the past few years debating the
issue whether "maximum sustainable yield" or "maximum economic yield" is the
more rational goal for high seas fishery management. See, e.g., F. CHRISTY & A.
Scott, THE CommoNr WEALTH OF OcEAN FIsHERiEs (1965). The relationship between
these two concepts is an interesting and important one for the North Pacific salmon
fishery as in other high seas fisheries, and is discussed at length in the article in this
symposium by Dr. James A. Crutchfield.
'Tripartite Treaty, art. XI, para. 2.
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about negotiations toward a new agreement. The aspirations of the
participants can be simply stated: Japan wants a larger share of the
North American spawned salmon, the United States wants the Japa-
nese to have a smaller share,4 and Canada wants to continue the total
exclusion of the Japanese from Canadian spawned salmon.
It might seem curious at first glance that the Japanese have not
terminated the Tripartite Treaty under the one-year termination pro-
vision. If they did, they would have the legal right to fish anywhere
outside the United States 12-mile fisheries zone, and could, of course,
take a much larger share of salmon. A number of reasons contribute
to their failure to take this action, one of the more important of which
is the ever tightening squeeze in which Japan is caught, between the
two most powerful nations in the world, the United States and the
Soviet Union.'
The Russians, like the Americans, objected to the Japanese catch of
salmon on the high seas, in their case Soviet-spawned salmon, and in
1956 entered the Northwest Pacific Fisheries Convention with Japan,
creating a Fishery Commission with the power to set annual quotas of
Soviet-spawned salmon to be taken on the high seas by Japanese fisher-
men. Over the past few years the Soviets have become increasingly
alarmed over the decline of Soviet-spawned salmon stocks; in addition,
they seek to increase their own quota vis-h-vis the Japanese under the
1956 convention; they have thus insisted upon a gradual reduction of
the Japanese high seas catch. At the same time, the United States con-
tinues to press for a larger share of the Bristol Bay salmon runs and
'The Japanese catch of North American spawned salmon taken west of the ab-
stention line is considerable, averaging an estimated 30% of the total (Japan-United
States) catch from the Bristol Bay run for the 10 years from 1956 to 1965, with
respective highs of 59.3% in 1957, 37.4% in 1961 and 24.1% in the spectacular run of
1965. There is little evidence that any of the salmon spawning in British Columbia
rivers, or in the rivers of Washington, Oregon, or California are caught by the
Japanese because few, if any, of these fish roam beyond the 1750 abstention line.
Furthermore, the Japanese are quite aware of the intense feelings generated by
the salmon issue among powerful political groups in the United States. Some Japa-
nese believe their country may be better off remaining with the present treaty, under
which they are only restricted from certain areas of the high seas, rather than
abrogating it and thereby risking the ill feeling that could be expected in this
country and the possible damage to other sectors of friendly Japan-United States
relations.
It should be remembered that, like Japan's attitude toward the United States, the
United States considers Japan's friendship and economic well-being important and
valuable assets. In spite of these general feelings of friendliness and good will,
however, it would be misleading to leave the impression that fishery negotiations
between the two countries are marked by attitudes of softness or indecision. They are
not. Those associated with the negotiations describe them as firm, tough, and in-
telligently handled on both sides.
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is attempting to push the abstention line further west in an effort to
exclude the Japanese salmon fishermen from an ever larger portion of
the North Pacific.
Given this pressure from both sides, the Japanese have very little
room to maneuver. Very possibly if they gained some slight advantage
over the Americans, the Russians would insist upon a proportionate
reduction in the Japanese quota, on the ground that the Japanese were
getting their "share" of salmon elsewhere. Thus, if the Japanese
were able to push the abstention line (now at longitude 1750 W.) five
degrees further east, the Soviets might insist upon adding this five-
degree area to the "zone" set up under the 1956 convention which now
borders on the 1750 line, and resist strenuously any increase in the
total Japanese quota.
Some observers have suggested the possibility of the Soviets and
Americans combining in new treaty negotiations to present a common
front against the Japanese concerning the latter's high seas salmon
fishery. With this combined power the two countries might put greater
pressure on the Japanese. After all, nearly all the salmon caught by
the Japanese are spawned in either Soviet or American streams. Sev-
eral reasons for the lack of such a common approach can be given.
Neither the Soviet nor United States governments apparently wishes to
push the Japanese that hard. Each has other, nonfishery reasons, both
political and economic, for staying on good terms with the Japanese.
Also, the United States has hesitated to deal directly with the Soviet
Union for fear the Russians will insist on other concessions for their
cooperation. Lastly, the Soviet Union is in an ambivalent position with
regard to abstention. They vigorously opposed the principle at the
1958 Geneva Conference, yet they certainly would be expected by the
United States to support it now in any joint dealings with Japan. But
if they did so, they might find that it works more to the benefit of the
Japanese than to themselves. The Japanese, after all, have a con-
siderably longer history of salmon fishing along the Siberian coast than
do the Russians, and the Japanese might claim that abstention re-
quires the Soviets to stay out of that part of the fishery historically
exploited by the Japanese.
The Soviet salmon runs along the Siberian coast are very large,
although not quite as large as those along the North American coast.
These runs are no doubt one of the reasons why the Russians have
never attempted to fish commercially for North American spawned
1967 ]
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salmon. If they fished for United States spawned salmon on the high
seas, the United States fishermen might reciprocate, with mutually
destructive results. Besides, both countries find that they can harvest
their salmon most economically close to their respective shores, near
the spawning streams. The Russians, like the Americans, do not en-
gage in high seas net fishing for salmon. Their fishing is limited to
coastal and territorial waters off the Soviet Union. Only the Japanese
fish for salmon with nets on the high seas.
This article will briefly describe the events that followed the sign-
ing of the Tripartite Treaty and the recent negotiations attempting to
replace or modify that treaty. After describing the current state of
negotiations between Japan and the United States, the article will
then examine several key isues that form the focal points of the
disagreement.6 Was Japan coerced into signing the Tripartite Treaty
in 1952? What is the meaning of the Protocol and the abstention line
at longitude 1750 W.? What is the standing of the abstention principle
in international law? What are the policy arguments for and against
abstention, especially in the North Pacific?' What will happen if the
Tripartite Treaty is abrogated and what then would be the effect of the
1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing? And finally, what effect might
Korean entry into the North Pacific fishery have on the relationship
of Japan, Canada and the United States?
' It should be noted too that the current controversy with Japan concerns the ques-
tion of who catches the fish, not who processes, markets, or consumes them. Nor is
"conservation," i.e., management toward maximum sustainable yield, the main issue
in the controversy. Both Japan and the United States agree that "conservation" of
the salmon resource is essential in order that the supply of fish not be depleted; this
concept is, after all, one of the cornerstones of the Tripartite Treaty. They do not,
however, agree on its implementation. Theoretically conservation management could
be carried out whether the fish are caught by Japanese or American fishermen. But
the situation is more complex than this. First, the goal of maximum sustainable
yield, although verbally accepted in the treaty, is not by any means the exclusive
and controlling goal of either of the two nations. Furthermore, the question of apply-
ing this goal to the several thousand salmon stocks of the North Pacific and Bering
Sea is the subject of continuing and heated controversy between the two nations, the
Japanese usually arguing that more salmon can properly be caught, and the Americans
arguing the opposite. It has been suggested at various times by the Japanese that
these problems of implementation might be solved more easily if they were allowed
to participate directly in the decision-making process. However, the Americans
fear that to do so might (1) somehow allow the Japanese to get a larger share of the
salmon, and (2) make the decision-making process too cumbersome to be workable.
The United States already has great difficulty in arriving at its own salmon man-
agement decisions, given the diversity of views among commercial fishermen, sports
fishermen, cannery owners, fishery scientists, and government officials. Bringing in
the Japanese, with a wholly different set of values and pressures, might bring the
whole process to a standstill.
'References made to the "North Pacific" in this article are intended to include
the Bering Sea unless otherwise indicated.
[ VOL. 43 : 1
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I. RECENT NEGOTIATIONS
The Tripartite Treaty requires the Japanese to abstain from fishing
for salmon in the Pacific Ocean or Bering Sea east of the meridian at
longitude 175' W.8 In the protocol to the treaty this line is clearly
denoted a "provisional" line, "subject to confirmation or readjust-
ment"9 at a later time, when more facts about the salmon are known.
Investigations are to be conducted by the North Pacific Fisheries
Commission (created by the treaty) and recommendations for a new
line reported to the three governments. The Commission is to deter-
mine if, in some areas, salmon originating in Canadian and United
States waters intermingle with salmon originating in Asian waters.
"If such areas are found the Commission shall conduct suitable studies
to determine a line or lines which best divide salmon of Asiatic and
salmon of North American origin."'' The provisional line at longitude
175' W. is not to be changed, however, unless "it can be shown beyond
a reasonable doubt that the new line or lines more equitably divide"'1
the salmon than the provisional line.
Recommendation of a new line requires a unanimous Commission
decision. In the event of failure to recommend such lines within a
reasonable time the matter is to be transferred to a special committee
of three scientists from nations other than the contracting nations. A
majority of this special committee can recommend a new line and the
Commission shall make its own recommendation in accordance there-
with.'2
Shortly after the signing of the Convention, United States fishermen
I This is the correct abstention line for salmon through the North Pacific and
north through most of the Bering Sea. However, in the northerly portion of the
Bering Sea the line changes somewhat, and is described thus:
the line starting from Cape Prince of Wales on the west coast of Alaska, running
westward to 168°58'59" West Longitude; thence due south to a point 65015'00"
North Latitude; thence along the great circle course which passes through 510
North Latitude and 167' East Longitude, to its intersection with meridian 175 °
West Longitude; thence south along a provisional line....
Tripartite Treaty, annex, para. 2.
'Tripartite Treaty, protocol (emphasis added):
The Governments of the United States of America, Canada, and Japan agree
that the line of meridian 1750 West Longitude and the line following the meri-
dian passing through the western extremity of Atka Island, which have been
adopted for determining the areas in which the exploitation of salmon is ab-
stained or the conservation measures for salmon continue to be enforced in
accordance with the provisions of the Annex to this Convention, shall be con-
sidered as provisional lines which shall continue in effect subject to confirina-
tionz or readjustment in accordance with the procedure mentioned below.
'
0 Tripartite Treaty, protocol.
"Id.
1Id.
1967]
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began to fear the effect of Japanese fishing for Bristol Bay salmon
beyond the 1750 line. These fears were expressed at the annual Com-
mission meeting in 1957;"' in 1958 the United States delegation de-
clared that unless the Japanese were regulated in their high seas catch
of Bristol Bay salmon the United States might have to close its own
inshore fishery for these stocks.14 The Japanese disagreed, stressing
the need for further "development" and suggesting that the United
States was not taking the maximum sustainable yield of these fish.
Subsequent meetings brought further disagreements over the Japanese
catch beyond the 175' line, and over the meaning of the language of
the protocol concerning the location of a new line. To resolve the
latter question an Ad Hoc Committee on the Protocol was appointed,' 5
but after studying the question the Committee was unable to arrive at
an agreement." The Commission thereupon adopted a resolution re-
questing the three signatory nations to "provide the Commission with
an interpretation of the intent of the Protocol as soon as is practi-
cable."' To date no interpretation has been agreed upon.
On the other hand, by 1959 it had become apparent that certain
herring stocks did not meet the abstention requirements and were
removed from the protection of the treaty. 8 In 1962 most of the
remainder of the herring stocks, and all the halibut in the "triangle"
area between the Pribilof Islands and the Aleutian chain were removed
from the protection of the treaty. 9 This latter decision was especially
important as a confirmation by the United States of its intent to "live
up to" the obligations of the treaty, even though doing so brought
severe criticism from within the country. It also demonstrated some of
the problems inherent in the abstention procedures within the treaty.
The Commission had taken the position that any nation advocating
a stock of fish for abstention must, under the treaty, carry the burden
of proof that the stock meets the treaty requirements. The United
States was thus called upon to prove that the maximum sustainable
yield of halibut was being taken from the "triangle" area. It was
unable to do so. The problem was not that the Japanese could prove
more fish could safely be taken from the area, but rather that the
" 1957 INT'L NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 8 [hereinafter cited as
INPFC ANN. REP.].
" 1958 INPFC ANN. REP. 2.
" 1956 INPFC ANN. REP. 8.
" 1959 INPFC ANN. REP. 4-5.
17 Id.
"1959 INPFC ANN. REP. 9.
"1962 INPFC ANN. REP. 11-13.
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United States could not prove otherwise. Failing satisfactory evidence
on either side of the issue the decision necessarily went against the
party carrying the burden of proof. The evidence marshalled by the
United States was insufficient for two reasons: relatively little fishing
had occurred in the area in previous years, and only minor research
had been conducted in the area.2°
Numerous other developments have also occurred since the treaty
was signed in 1953 which suggest the need for review of the treaty
structure .2  Thus in 1963, when the 10-year mandatory life of the
treaty came to an end, pressure was initiated in both countries toward
renegotiation. Negotiators were appointed and held two meetings in
1963, one in Washington, D.C., in June, and the other in Tokyo in
September. A third meeting was held in Ottawa in September, 1964.
These meetings have not resulted in any new agreement. 2
At the June 1963 meeting Mr. Masayoshi Ito, chairman of the
Japanese delegation, called for a new North Pacific treaty which would
abandon the principle of abstention.2 3 Reference was made to the in-
trusion of the large Soviet fishing fleet into the convention area and
' Johnson, Fishery Developments in the Pacific, in DEVELOPMENTS -IN THE LAW
OF THE SEA 1958-1964 at 140-41 (British Institute of International and Comparative
Law Spec. Pub. No. 6, 1965).
The first year after the "triangle" was opened the catch increased excessively,
resulting in a severe decline in the resource and suggesting that possibly the area
should not have been subjected to a greater fishing effort. Total production in the
brief 1965 season in which 27 Canadian and United States vessels operated was
553,000 pounds, only 25.8% of the 1964 figure. 1965 INPFC ANN. REP. 9. In recent
years the imposition of stringent controls has gradually brought about the rehabili-
tation of the resource.
1 Some of the more significant developments which affect the Tripartite Treaty
were discussed in a series of articles appearing in a 1962 Japanese fisheries tradejournal. The subheadings in these articles indicate the broad range of relevant
post-treaty developments:
1. Extension of range of operations of Japanese mothership-type salmon fishery.
2. Development of Japanese mothership-type bottomfish fishery.
3. United States systematized control of Bristol Bay fishery.
4. Development of scientific knowledge on the intermingling of salmon of North
American and Asian origin on the high seas.
5. Progressive expansion of Soviet fisheries in the Northern waters.
6. Establishment of closer ties between Japan and the United States after con-
clusion of the Peace Treaty.
7. Alaskan statehood.
8. Increase of Japanese exports of marine products to the United States.
9. International trend toward regulation of fisheries.
10. Rejection of abstention principle under international law.
11. Effect of Russian-Japanese fisheries treaty.
News Concerning Developments in Japanese Fishing Industry, U.S. Bur. Comm.
Fish., Japanese Press Transl., Aug. 8, 1962, at 3-10. (Minato Shimbun, July 25-
Aug. 3, 1962.)
'Taguchi, The Salmon Resources and Salmon Fisheries Around the Pacific
Ocean, U.S. Bur. Com. Fish. Transl., 1966, 10-14 (Taiheiyosan sake-inam shigen to
sono gyagyj).
' Seattle Times, June 6, 1963, at 1, col. 3.
1967]
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the need to reform the agreement in order to take account of resulting
changes. Mr. Ito also pointed out that the large Japanese bottomfish
fleet operating off Alaska could not avoid catching a substantial num-
ber of halibut in their nets, which, under the treaty, were required to
be thrown back into the sea. In view of the difficulties of sorting out
and throwing back the halibut, many of which are necessarily injured
in the process, and in view of the disproportionately greater value of
the Japanese bottomfish fishery in comparison to the United States
halibut fishery, the Japanese urged a change in the treaty to allow
them to retain these accidentally caught fish. The Japanese proposed
a new draft treaty which, although never made public, was reported in
the press as discarding the abstention principle and accounting for the
large scale expansion of Soviet fishing fleets in the area. -4
The United States rejected the Japanese proposals. The Japanese
were told that the United States and Canada had both moral and his-
toric rights to salmon spawned in North American streams and to
halibut in the Gulf of Alaska."' These two countries then proposed
that limits be set on Japanese fishing east of the 175' line as to num-
bers of fish, types of gear and times for fishing. It was noted that the
Russians and Japanese, through a joint commission, each year set the
number of salmon the Japanese are permitted to take on the high
seas.26 The United States felt it should similarly have a voice in the
Japanese high seas catch of North American spawned salmon.
The United States delegation was urged by United States fishing
interests to seek additional protection for Bristol Bay red salmon at the
second meeting of the negotiators in Tokyo, in September 1963. The
industry urged that this country threaten the Japanese with economic
sanctions if agreement could not be reached. Senators Magnuson
and Bartlett, of Washington and Alaska, demanded that the Japanese
abstain from fishing for North American spawned salmon anywhere on
the high seas, east or west of the 175' abstention line. The possibility
of moving the abstention line further east if the Japanese would agree
to abstain completely from fishing for North American spawned salmon
was mentioned. These Senators urged continued recognition of the
historic rights claim formulated by former Secretary of State Cordell
Hull in the late 1930's. It was reported that the American negotiators
' Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 7, 1963, at 41, col. 2.
- Seattle Times, June 16, 1963, at 38, col. 3.
' Seattle Times, June 16, 1963, at 38, col. 3.
"' Seattle Times, Sept. 6, 1963, at 18, col. 3.
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were surprised at the firmness of the Japanese in demanding abolition
of the abstention principle.2 Such a stand should not have been sur-
prising in view of the vigorous opposition to this principle often ex-
pressed in Japan.29 The Japanese characterized the principle as caus-
ing "unfair monopolistic discrimination" and as being "completely
unreasonable." Four objections to abstention were raised: (1) the
North Pacific Treaty was negotiated while Japan was still under allied
military occupation and the Japanese position at the time was so weak
they could not adequately protect their own interests; (2) as the most
active fishing nation in the world Japan is interested in exploiting all
her rights under the basic doctrine of freedom of the seas, a doctrine
the United States has strongly advocated in times past; (3) Japan has
serious fishing problems with several other nations and by agreeing to
the abstention principle she seriously weakens her position with these
other nations who would also like to ask the Japanese to abstain from
fishing certain other stocks of fish; (4) Japan is perfectly willing and
capable of engaging in genuine conservation measures toward develop-
ing and maintaining maximum sustainable yield if the abstention
principle is dropped.30
At the Tokyo session the United States surprised the Japanese by
agreeing to drop the abstention principle.3 Apparently this was an
agreement to drop the principle in name only, in effect, still requiring
the Japanese to refrain from fishing the same stocks of fish. In return
for the change the Americans asked that all parties to the new treaty
Seattle Times, Sept. 22, 1963, at 34, col. 6.
Reports in Japanese publications indicate strong pressure from some political
groups, and from the fishery industry, to abolish the abstention principle, through
abrogation of the treaty under the one-year notice provision if necessary. For
example, in 1963 the Japanese Socialist Party urged the Japanese Government to
"immediately give notice to the United States and Canada of Japan's intention to
formally terminate the present treaty" and prepare a new one which would include
concepts of equality, reciprocity and freedom of the high seas. California Fish
Canners Ass'n, Japanese Press Transl., June 21, 1963, at 1. The Japan Socialist
Party again called for abrogation of the treaty in August, 1965; see PAc. FiSHERMAN,
Sept., 1965, at 16. (Suisan Keizai Shimbun, June 12, 1963.)
At the Ottawa meeting of the treaty negotiators in 1964 it was reported that the
Japanese Government was receiving "strong pressure from industry" not to com-
promise on the issue of abstention. U.S. Bur. Com. Fish., Japanese Press Trans].,
Aug. 27, 1964, at 1. (Suisan Keizai Slimnbun, Aug. 16, 1964.) In October, 1964, Mr.
Iwao Fujita, Vice President, Japan Fisheries Society, urged the Japanese fisheries in-
dustry to consider whether Japan should abrogate the treaty if negotiations drag on
without making any progress. U.S. Bur. Com. Fish., Japanese Press Transl., Oct. 14,
1964, at 2. (Suisan Keizai Slimbun, Oct. 7, 1964.) At the same time the fisheries in-
dustry argued that it was meaningless to continue the negotiations and urged the
government to abrogate the treaty. Id.
= Seattle Times, Sept. 22, 1963, at 10, col. 1.
Seattle Times, Sept. 25, 1963, at 73, col. 4.
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restrict their fishing east of the 175 0 line to waters and methods used in
the previous five years. The effect of this would be to bar Japan from
all salmon fishing east of the line and prevent any expansion of Japa-
nese halibut fishing in the same area. It would, of course, also prohibit
Canadians and Americans from changing catching methods or exploit-
ing bottomfish which Japan had been taking east of 175'. The apparent
intent of these new provisions was to create the aura of bilateral
restraint, i.e., restraint in fishing effort both by Japan and the United
States, and not merely by the former. These proposals did not meet
with Japan's favor. They were characterized by one spokesman as
"no more than a euphemism expressed in what appeared to be a com-
promising semantic."3 The Japanese claimed that the proposal totally
ignored the three basic principles which Japan demanded: freedom of
the high seas, equal access to the resources, and joint (tripartite)
control measures for the conservation thereof.
The poor Bristol Bay salmon fishing runs in 1962, 1963, and 1964
lent urgency to the negotiations held in September, 1964."3 However,
the positions of the principals remained adamant. The Japanese said
the United States appeared to want a monopolistic and exclusive in-
terest in North Pacific salmon fishery. The Americans continued to
criticize the Japanese for their high seas salmon fishing on the ground
(among others) that immature stocks of Bristol Bay salmon were
being taken. Reports of the meeting said the United States was taking
a stiffer line regarding halibut due to the disastrous fishing decline
that followed the opening of the Bering Sea "triangle" to Japanese
fishermen in 1962.
34
This third round ended in Ottawa without agreement. No date or
place was set for the next meeting. The Ottawa meetings were de-
scribed as "friendly but searching;" however, observers could detect
no progress. 5 Shortly after the meeting, the Japanese Agriculture-
Forestry Minister, Munenori Akagi, said it was politically difficult for
the United States to make any concession during a presidential cam-
paign year. In the United States this was construed by some as sug-
gesting the need for a fourth round of negotiations soon after the
elections when United States negotiators would feel free to make some
substantial concessions to the Japanese. Some United States sources
1
2 Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Int'l Weekly ed.), Oct. 15, 1963.
' See estimates of the high seas catches given in Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game
Informational Leaflet No. 82, June 15, 1966.
Seattle Times, Sept. 14, 1964, at 1, col. 3.
Seattle Times, Oct. 1, 1964, at 31, col. 2.
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warned of a possible "post election giveway."88 At the same time
agitation mounted in Japan for abrogation of the Tripartite Treaty if
negotiations did not produce a new, acceptable agreementY Some
voices urged retention of the present treaty on the ground that so long
as no new agreement was reached on a new abstention line, the Japa-
nese could legally continue to take large quantities of United States
spawned salmon west of that line.38
To date no new negotiations have been held, and none are planned.
Both sides continue to express their dissatisfaction with the present
state of affairs. In the spring of 1965, representatives of the fishing
industry from Washington, Oregon, and Alaska met with State De-
partment officials in Washington, D.C., to discuss methods of prevent-
ing the possibility of Japanese high seas fishing for Bristol Bay salmon
during the summer of 1965. These representatives repeated a request
that in the future American negotiators hold out for a new treaty which
would move the provisional abstention line ten degrees further west.
To increase the pressure on the Japanese, the United States Senate
passed a bill on May 19, 1965, permitting the President to increase
import duties on fish products by as much as 50 percent for any
country whose practices were "found to be injurious to United States
fish conservation programs."39 Although Japan was not mentioned
specifically in the bill, the sponsors made it clear that Japan was the
country to be punished.40 Also during May, the newly formed Con-
gress of American Fishermen threatened a national boycott of Jap-
anese imports effective June 1, 1965, unless the Japanese agreed not to
fish for United States spawned salmon, east or west of the abstention
line. About the same time, Alaska's Governor Egan proposed a plan
whereby a low dam would be built across Bristol Bay which would
' Seattle Times, Oct. 6, 1964, at 8, col. 1.
'U.S. Bur. Com. Fish., Japanese Press Transl., Oct. 14, 1964, at 2. (Suisan Keizai
Shlinibu, Oct. 7, 1964.)
' U.S. Bur. Com. Fish., supra note 29.
S. 1734, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
S. REP. No. 194, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1965):
The law for many years has prohibited American fishermen from engaging in
high seas salmon net fishing. It has been clearly established by scientific
evidence that high seas salmon fishing with nets is detrimental to the conser-
vation of the resources and is shockingly wasteful. Despite this clear evidence,
the Japanese high seas fishery has within the past several years engaged in the
taking of salmon of American origin on the high seas with nets.
The wastefulness of high seas salmon fishing was emphasized by several
witnesses... [Dr. William F. Royce, Governor William A. Egan; Congressman
Lloyd Meeds, Washington State.].
Those opposed to the bill (S. 1734) included the Japan Fisheries Association and
the American Seafood Distributors Association.
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stop the migration of these salmon to the sea if the Japanese persisted
in their high seas salmon fishery. (This is reminiscent of the 1961
effort by Alaska, on the basis of historic rights, to declare Bristol Bay,
inside the 170 mile line drawn from Cape Newenham to Cape Men-
shikof, internal waters; this effort was thwarted by Secretary of State
Rusk's declaration on behalf of the United States denying any historic
claim to these waters.) 4 Although the Egan plan was considered
biologically absurd by the United States scientists, it nonetheless
served to exemplify the angry mood of the Alaskans concerning the
Japanese high seas salmon fishery.
Japan answered these charges in late May 1965, arguing that its
fishermen planned to fish only west of longitude 1750 W. in accordance
with their legal right under the Tripartite Treaty; that the 175 line
was established as a compromise line because the areas and rates of
mixing of North American and Asian salmon were not known; and
that Japan had never absolutely agreed not to catch salmon of North
American origin but only to refrain from taking them east of the 1750
line so long as the United States met the conditions set out in article
III(1) (a) of the Tripartite Treaty.4 2
The threatened action by United States fishing interests did not
bear much visible fruit. The Senate Bill permitting the President to
increase import duties on Japanese (or other nation's) products when
that nation refuses to act in accordance with United States fish conser-
vation laws failed to pass in the House. The attempted boycott of the
Congress of American Fishermen received little support from the
public and apparently had little impact on Japanese trade with the
United States. Whether these threats had any substantial impact on
Japanese policy is a matter of conjecture. In any event, during the
summer of 1965 eleven Japanese motherships and 369 catcher vessels
fished for salmon on the high seas west of longitude 1750 W. and took
"' This claim arose when Alaska attempted to impose a fish processors tax on the
Arctic Maid, a vessel licensed in the State of Washington and operating more than
three miles offshore but with small catcher vessels operating within three miles.
Alaska attempted to impose its tax on the Arctic Maid on the ground that Bristol
Bay was legally internal waters because of long established historic claims by the
United States and Alaska. While an appeal was pending in the case before the state
supreme court the United States filed an amicus curiae brief, in which it referred to
a letter written by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the United States Attorney-
General setting out the official United States position on territorial sea claims on
Bristol Bay. The Secretary denied any historic rights claim to the bay, then said
the United States only claimed that area allowed under article 7 of the Territorial
Sea Convention of 1958 providing for a maximum closing line of 24 miles in bays.
See Rosenow. North Pacific Fisheries Treaties and International Law of the Seas,
38 WAsH. L. REv. 223 (1963) ; Johnson, supra note 20.
12 Portland Oregonian, May 27, 1965, at 33, col. 1.
[ VOL. 43 : 1
JAPAN-U.S. SALMON CONFLICT
an estimated 6,168,000 Bristol Bay red salmon, 24.1 percent of the
total estimated catch of 33,236,000."
In the United States public criticism of Japanese high seas salmon
fishing dropped very rapidly as the 1965 season progressed, when it
became apparent that a record run was in the making. Whether or not
the accusations that the Japanese fishermen were in the long run
depleting the Bristol Bay stocks were true, such criticism seemed un-
timely in the face of the largest run in history.4
The heated accusations of 1965 were not repeated in 1966, or at
least they appeared in much subdued form, both sides apparently
becoming resigned to a continuation of the status quo.
II. WAS JAPAN COERCED INTO SIGNING THE
TRIPARTITE TREATY IN 1952?
Over the past few years some Japanese have complained that their
country was coerced into accepting the terms of the Tripartite Treaty.
They charge that the negotiations for the treaty occurred during No-
vember and December 1951, while Japan was still occupied, before
the ratification of the Peace Treaty by the United States on April
15, 1952, and before the effective date of the Peace Treaty on April
28, 1952.4 5
The charge of duress has not generally been recognized in interna-
tional law as grounds for vitiating a treaty. 6 Although writers have
criticized this rule it has not been changed. However, whether or not
a treaty is legally binding, the "lasting effect of any... treaty will
depend far more on its intrinsic fairness as viewed in later years, and
on the subsequent course of international politics, than upon its legally
binding character."4 It is therefore important to examine carefully the
charge of "duress" made by Japan. In this context it should be
remembered that the mandatory life of the Tripartite Treaty was 10
years. Since 1963 Japan has been in a position to "legally" terminate
Informational Leaflet No. 82, supra note 33.
" Id.
"
5 See, e.g., Taguchi, supra note 22, at 1; T. MATSUSHITA, THE JAPAN-UNITED
STATEs-CANADA FISHERY TREATY 15 (U.S. Bur. of Comm. Fish. Transl. Ser. No. 20,
July 25, 1958); U.S. Bur. of Comm. Fish. Japanese Press Transl. Aug. 8, 1962;
(Minato Shlimbun July 25-Aug. 3, 1962); Address by Edward W. Allen, Northwest
Pacific Regional Conference on Int'l Law, Univ. of British Columbia, April 6,
1963; Seattle Times, Sept. 22, 1963, at 10, col. 1.
"
0 See 5 G. HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (1943); W. BISHOP, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 95-96 (1953).
11J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 230-31 (4th ed. 1949); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW § 499 (7th ed. 1948).
's W. BISHOP, supra note 46.
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the treaty, on any grounds whatsoever (or without any grounds),
merely by serving one year notice. This tends to reduce the importance
of the duress argument, although the Japanese point out that the
posture of the two countries in the present stalemate is a product of
the pattern set in 1952 and that one of the important reasons why the
Japanese are so unhappy with the treaty is their belief that they were
over-borne at that time.
The question of duress can only be considered in the context of the
total relationship of the two countries during the period in question.
The Second World War had ended just 6 years earlier. Japan was
still occupied, although that occupation was now coming to an end.
The times were uncertain for Japan, the future holding both promise
and hazard for a new and unstable economy. The Japanese people
were grateful to the United States for the humane manner in which
this country treated Japan after the war, and for the food, industrial
equipment, building supplies and other economic aid. Because of their
defeat and the circumstances attending that event, the Japanese people
had become rather disillusioned with their prewar and wartime mili-
tarist regime, had lost much of their national self-confidence, and had
tended to turn away from nationalism, militarism and aggression
toward internationalism, pacifism, and law and order.49
The more immediate background for the negotiations on the Tripar-
tite Fisheries Treaty was the impending ratification of the Japanese
Treaty by the United States. This treaty meant a great deal to the
Japanese in terms of sovereignty, independence, and termination of the
occupation. The chronology of events surrounding the Peace Treaty
and the Tripartite Fisheries Treaty deserves careful notice:5 °
September 8, 1951: Peace Treaty signed by Japan, United States and
forty-six other nations. (Japan-United States defense treaty signed at
same time.)
October 26, 1951: Peace Treaty ratified by Japanese Diet.
November 4-December 14, 1951: Negotiations for Tripartite Fisheries
Treaty.
March 20, 1952: United States Senate advises ratification of Peace
Treaty.
April 15, 1952: President Truman ratifies Peace Treaty.
April 28, 1952: Peace Treaty becomes effective. (Japan-United States
defense treaty effective same date.)
May 9, 1952: Tripartite Treaty signed by all parties in Tokyo.
4 E. REISCHAUER, JAPAN-PAST AND PRESENT 202-05, 250-58 (2nd ed. 1964); E.
REISCHAUER, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 205, 222, 296 (3d ed. 1965).
Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 2490, T.I.A.S. No. 2490,
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July 30, 1952: President Truman ratifies Tripartite Treaty.
June 9, 1953: Japan ratifies Tripartite Treaty.
June 12, 1953: Tripartite Treaty enters into force.
Thus while the Tripartite Treaty was being negotiated, the United
States Senate was considering the approval of the Peace Treaty. Be-
cause of the vital importance of the Peace Treaty to Japan, and be-
cause of the Japanese fear of antagonizing the Senate into either re-
fusing to approve, or delaying approval of this important document,
some Japanese claim Japan was unfairly constrained in their bargain-
ing on the fisheries treaty. They also point out that the pattern of
events preceding the fishery treaty negotiations gave Japan reason to
fear for her bargaining power on the fisheries issue. One of these
events was the exchange of letters between Prime Minister Yoshida
and Secretary of State Dulles in February, 1951. To understand the
significance of this exchange it is necessary to comment on certain
preliminary matters.
Immediately following the war the United States became concerned
that Japanese fishermen might suddenly acquire an interest in Bering
Sea and North Pacific salmon and send a fishing fleet out to participate
in those fisheries. To prevent that possibility the Supreme Com-
mander, Allied Powers issued a directive, on June 22, 1946, estab-
lishing the "McArthur Line" beyond which Japanese fishermen were
prohibited from fishing. This line enclosed the area immediately
around the Japanese islands and that portion of the high seas lying due
east of these islands for about 1500 to 2000 miles.51 It did not include
the Bering Sea, or any part of the Pacific in which North American
spawned salmon can be found. This line remained in effect until
April 12, 1952.52 Prior to its repeal the United States again became
concerned that between the time of repeal and the effective date of the
Tripartite Fisheries Treaty on June 12, 1953, the Japanese might
attempt to send a salmon fleet into the Bering Sea or North Pacific;
thus the Yoshida-Dulles exchange of letters occurred.53 The Japanese
government promised to prohibit fishing activities in those areas where
international or domestic conservation regimes were in existence, and
where Japanese nationals or Japanese vessels had not been engaged in
fishing in 1940.
136 U.N.T.S. No. 1832, at 49. Tripartite Treaty, mspra note 1 (205 U.N.T.S. No.
2770, at 65).
'See map, Appendix.
"Taguchi, supra note 22, at 7.
= Id,
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Some Japanese have since argued that the chain of events preceding
the negotiation of the Tripartite Treaty placed the Japanese in an
awkward position. The Japanese were aware of the widespread dis-
trust in the United States of their fishery ambitions. They were con-
cerned that this distrust would heighten, and that unless Japan cooper-
ated in the fish treaty negotiations they might be further restrained
from participating in the high seas fishery. 4
Apparently some thought had been given to the inclusion of the fish-
eries agreement as part of the overall Peace Treaty,5 but this was
rejected and the Peace Treaty only provided generally that Japan
would shortly engage in a fisheries treaty for the North Pacific and
would recognize the need for conservation measures for the stocks of
fish found there.5"
In view of these events, the questionable sovereign equality of Japan
at the time of the fishery negotiations assumes some importance. The
status of Japan in this respect was apparently considered doubtful
enough to be the subject of a "Memorandum" from the Supreme
Allied Command to the Japanese Government,57 dated November 5,
1951 (the opening date of the fishery negotiations) wherein the Su-
preme Command purported to affirm the sovereign status of Japan for
the purpose of negotiations, saying: 5
In order that there may be no misunderstanding with reference to the
status of the Government of Japan for the purpose of the negotiations ...
it is hereby confirmed that the Japanese delegation will negotiate and
conclude the said International Convention on the basis that the Govern-
ment of Japan possesses ad hoc sovereign equality with the governments
of Canada and the United States.
It would seem that rather than prove the fact of Japan's "sovereign
equality" at the time, this document tends to prove that such status
was at least in doubt; otherwise, why would such a document be
necessary! 9 Furthermore, the document only purports to confirm
"U.S. Bur. of Comm. Fish., supra note 45, at 2.
"T. MATSUSHITA, supra note 45, at 4.
'Treaty of Peace with Japan, art. 9, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 2490, T.I.A.S. 2490,
136 U.N.TS. No. 1832, at 45:
Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring
for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the
regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of
fisheries on the high seas.
' JAPAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRIPARTITE FISHERIES CONFERENCE 149
(1951). [Hereinafter cited as TRIPARTITE CONF. PROC.]
" Id.
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Japanese sovereignty for this one, "ad hoc," purpose whereas ex-
perience in international relations suggests that a nation's strength in
negotiating any particular treaty results from its ability to "trade-off"
something desired by the other participant in a quite different, and
unrelated area. The possibility of such a trade-off would seem less
likely where a nation is sovereign for one purpose only.
Nonetheless the Japanese did not, at the time, complain of any lack
of freedom on their part to refuse to enter the treaty if they wanted to,
or to press hard for terms of their choosing. In fact at the closing of
the negotiating conference the Japanese delegation said they were6 0
exceedingly happy that the delegations of the United States, Canada,
and Japan, through sincere discussions which extended over a month,
have arrived at a unanimous agreement on the draft international con-
vention .... It is the firm conviction of the Japanese delegation that...
the Conference has been brought to a fruitful conclusion through under-
standing and respect of each other's position. We particularly appreciate
the considerations given by the United States delegation in understand-
ing the position of Japan ....
Again, at the opening organizational meeting of the Commission cre-
ated by the treaty, the Minister Plenipotentiary of Japan remarked
how "extremely happy" Japan was with the Treaty, and he expressed
confidence that the principles set forth in it would be a "guiding spirit"
for the conduct of fisheries in other areas of the high seas.6 ' Even as
late as 1963 the late, respected Mr. Koichiro Kobayashi, then Presi-
"It should be remembered that the authority which SCAP held was extremely
extensive and absolute, as illustrated by part of the text of the message transmitted
September 6, 1945, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General McArthur, approved
by President Truman:
The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State is
subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will
exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our
relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional
surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question
on the part of the Japanese as to its scope .... You may enforce the orders issued
by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the
use of force.
U.S. DEPr. OF STATE, THE Axis IN DEFEAT: A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN POLICY TowARD GERMANY AND JAPAN at 114. The question of the effec-
tiveness of this Memorandum to give Japan equal sovereign status is commented upon
in T. MATSUSHITA, supra note 45, at 15.
' See TRIPARTITE CoN7. PROC. at 189. The Japanese delegation to the Fisheries
Conference also said, some 5r/2 months prior to the effective date of the peace treaty,
that the fisheries "Treaty to be concluded on this occasion is the first to be
negotiated and entered into by Japan on the basis of sovereign equality since the
war." Tan'.urnx CoxF. PROC. at 173.
" Remarks as quoted in an Address by Edward W. Allen, Northwest Pacific
Regional Conference on International Law, at the Univ. of British Columbia, April
6, 1963. See generally INPFC, PROCEEDINGS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING (1954).
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dent of Nichiro Fisheries Company, one of Japan's largest fishing
companies, said in Vancouver, B.C. that "we voluntarily and willingly
joined these treaties, and the purpose of all is conservation of the
[fish] stocks."62
Two principal reasons can be cited for the view that Japan was not
overreached in 1953. First, Japan had not participated in any signifi-
cant degree in the high seas salmon fishery for North American
spawned salmon prior to the Second World War; thus, in signing the
Tripartite Treaty Japan was not giving up anything it already had,
but was only foregoing a possible expectancy. Second, the treaty was
written with a mandatory life of only 10 years, after which Japan
could legally abrogate it for any reason upon one year's notice. If the
United States had such enormous power, and purported to use it at the
bargaining table to overwhelm a weakened Japan, it seems anomalous
that all it would demand was a 10 year agreement. Moreover, after
only 5 years under that agreement the United States became charged
with the burden of proving each year that each stock of fish recom-
mended for abstention continued to meet all the abstention require-
ments. That this was no mere formality was demonstrated by the
failure of the United States to prove that the herring and certain
halibut stocks required abstention; these were removed from absten-
tion within this second 5-year period. More significantly, Japan, four
years after the end of the mandatory life of the treaty, has not seen
fit to bring about its termination, indicating that it still contains more
advantages than disadvantages for the Japanese.
III. DISAGREEMENT OVER THE MEANING OF THE PROTOCOL
AND THE ABSTENTION LINE AT LONGITUDE 1750 W.
The protocol63 to the Tripartite Treaty (which is also part of the
treaty) contains language that has been the subject of extensive argu-
ment between Japan and the United States. To understand this dis-
pute it is necessary to recall that in 1953, when the treaty went into
effect, it was thought that few North American spawned salmon wan-
dered west of the abstention line located, for the most part,64 at longi-
tude 1750 W. Subsequently scientists have discovered that large num-
bers of these salmon can be found as far west as longitude 1700 E.,
6 Seattle Times, Nov. 26, 1963, at 41, col. 5.
The protocol became part of the treaty by agreement of the three nations. See
TRrPARTITE CONF. PROC. at 103, 109.
" See Tripartite Treaty, supra note 8.
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some 15 degrees further west than the abstention line.65 The United
States maintains that the meaning and "spirit" of the treaty dictates
that the Japanese abstain from fishing for North American spawned
salmon, wherever they might be found; that the purpose of drawing the
provisional line was simply to assist in administering the treaty until
further investigations could occur; and that those investigations con-
clusively prove that United States spawned salmon"' roam west of
The following estimates* of catches of maturing Bristol Bay sockeye salmon by
the Japanese west of long. 1750 W. were supplied the author by private communica-
tion from R. A. Fredin, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, in May, 1967.
Year Longitudinal Interval Catch
1956 170E - 175E 1,458,000
175E - 180E 798,000
180W- 175W 496,000
1957 Same 2,855,000
2,189,000
2,616,000
1958 Same 997,000
17,000
000,000
1959 Same 777,000
293,000
000,000
1960 Same 559,000
863,000
2,585,000
1961 Same 1,321,000
749,000
4,350,000
1962 Same 708,000
401,000
205,000
1963 Same 423,000
556,000
37,000
1964 Same 420,000
103,000
93,000
1965 Same 660,000
1,586,000
3,919,000
10-year average,
1956-1965 Same 1,018,000
756,000
1,431,000
* Estimates are based on assumption that all sockeye salmon caught by the high seas salmon
fishery in the indicated longitudinal intervals during certain times of the fishing season are maturing
Bristol Bay fish. Although available scientific evidence supports the assumption for years of large
runs of Bristol Bay sockeye, it remains to be demonstrated that the assumption is valid for other
years, particularly with respect to the high seas catches between long. 1700 and 1750 E.
Catch statistics for 1956-1960 are from INPFC Bull. 15; Catch statistics for 1961-1965 are from
INPFC statistical yearbooks; Catch statistics for 1966 are preliminary. Final figures will be given
in the 1966 INPFC statistical yearbook.
cId.
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this line, (and that an average of some 30 percent of the total Bristol
Bay catch is caught there by the Japanese); therefore the line should
be moved further west. The Japanese contend, to the contrary, that
the literal language of the treaty is controlling and that this language
only requires them to abstain from fishing for North American
spawned salmon east of the provisional line. Further they contend
that the line should not be moved further west because this would
place a disproportionate number of Asian spawned salmon east of the
line, and that they have not agreed, and did not intend to agree, to
abstain from fishing for Asian spawned salmon.
The protocol expressly recognized that the line at longitude 1750 W.
was "provisional" and subject to relocation at some future time. The
argument is over the criteria that are to be applied in relocating the
line. Certain ambiguities in the protocol make the question difficult to
resolve.6
7
The protocol provides that the Commission shall, as expeditiously as
possible, investigate the waters of the convention area6"
to determine if there are areas in which salmon originating in the rivers
of Canada and the United States ... intermingle with salmon originating
in the rivers of Asia. If such areas are found the Commission shall
conduct suitable studies to determine a line or lines which best divide
salmon of Asiatic origin, and salmon of Canadian and United States ...
origin, from which... [the Japanese] ... have agreed to abstain... and
whether it can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that this line or lines
more equitably divide such salmon than the provisional lines .... In
accordance with these determinations the Commission shall recommend
that such provisional lines be confirmed or that it be changed ... giving
due consideration to adjustments required to simplify administration.
'An interesting difference exists in the way the business communities of these
two countries tend to look at contracts. One Japan-United States comparative law
expert has said:
Japanese businessmen, unlike Americans, do not habitually use formal detailed
contracts drafted with a view to enforcement by litigation in their domestic
business relations; they traditionally have preferred flexibility in their hier-
archical relations to meet problems as they unfold and preferred social power and
conciliation to resolve disputes.
Henderson, Contract Problems in U.S.-Japanese Joint Ventures, 39 WAsHi. L. REv.
479, 510 (1964). The Japanese rely relatively little on litigation in domestic business
affairs regarding contracts, "depending more on traditional organizational patterns,
social hierarchy, and authority, which always have been the dominant features of
perhaps the world's most socially (not legally) organized society." Id. at 481. The
Tripartite Treaty is not, of course, controlled by Japanese law or custom, but rather
by the rules of international law. These rules tend to treat treaties legalistically; that
is, as creating specific, enforceable rights and obligations between the parties that, so
far as possible, remain the same through time. The rules of international law suggest
an approach to the Tripartite Treaty more in accord with American legal tradition
than with Japanese law and custom.
Tripartite Treaty, protocol.
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Then comes an arbitration clause, providing that in the event the
Commission cannot agree upon a new line, the matter will be referred
to a "special committee" of scientists from neutral countries to make
recommendations. When this special committee has made its deter-
mination, the Commission "shall make" its own recommendations to
the states involved "in accordance therewith."
One of the key questions during the negotiations for the treaty was
whether Japanese fishermen would abstain from fishing only in certain
areas or only for certain stocks of fish. The final treaty incorporated
both ideas. Although the United States favored abstention applied
solely to stocks of fish, 9 the problems in administering such an
arrangement seemed to dictate the drawing of a geographic line. The
Japanese also initially wanted the abstention principle stated only in
terms of stocks of fish.70
Apparently the Japanese argued for stock abstention, instead of
area abstention, on the assumption they would then be excluded from
a smaller portion of the Bering Sea. This view rested upon the premise,
later proven false, that North American spawned salmon did not roam
as far west as longitude 1750 W" and did not mix with Asian spawned
salmon, which were not protected by the treaty and which the Japa-
nese wanted to continue catching. It is interesting, in this regard,
that the Japanese explicitly retained the right to catch Asian spawned
salmon east of longitude 175' W. in those areas where only salmon
of Asian origin can be found. At no place in the Proceedings do the
Japanese agree to abstain from fishing for salmon of North American
origin that roam west of the 1750 line, although the United States con-
tends this was the underlying intent of the treaty.72 It was assumed
at the time that few of these fish ever went beyond this line.73
"See Tn'A.TrrE CoNF. Paoc. 49, 102.
The Japanese delegation to the third meeting of the Committee on Biology and
Conservation on December 1, 1951, inquired whether "it was necessary to draw a
demarcation line in the Bering Sea, and added they would be in favor of using the
words 'the seaward limits of the area in which Pacific salmon of North American
origin might be found' to designate this area." See TRIPARTITE CoNF. PROC. 127.
The same attitude is evidenced at the 15th meeting of the Committee on Principles
and Drafting, December 13, 1951, where it was discussed whether the Japanese were
to abstain from fishing for the salmon originating in the Western Aleutian islands
which lay beyond long. 175" W. The Japanese argued, and the United States reluc-
tantly agreed, that this stock of fish was not being taken by United States fishermen
to the maximum sustainable yield and thus should not be protected by the abstention
principle. See TRIaRTIrT Co r. PROC. 104-105, 131, 134.
' See TRPARTITE CoxnrF. PRoc. 183; INPFC REPORT OF U.S. SEC. MEETING 6, 19(U.S., Bur. of Comm. Fish. Circ. No. 85, March, 1960); see generally S. ODA, INTER-
NATIONAL CONTROL OF U.S. SEC. MEETING, supra note 71, at 9.72INPFC, REPORT OF U.S. SEC. MEETING, suepra note 71, at 9.
m Id.
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Because of the uncertainty of scientific knowledge, the protocol
provided for investigations by the Commission to determine if and
where the salmon originating from the two continents mixed, and, if
found to mix, what new line would "best divide" or "more equitably
divide," Asian salmon from North American salmon-from which the
Japanese "have agreed to abstain." Much disagreement has occurred
over the meaning of this language. The Japanese contend that the
line should divide the salmon originating from the two continents in
such a way that the number of North American salmon found west of
the line is approximately equal to the number of Asian salmon found
east of the line. This would permit the Japanese to catch large num-
bers of Bristol Bay red salmon which cross the line; it would not
seriously interfere with their ability to catch salmon of Asian origin
which move east of the line, because these salmon eventually return
west of the line on their way to Asian streams to spawn. The United
States objects to this interpretation because American fishermen are
prohibited by their own conservation laws from fishing on the high
seas anywhere near the 1750 line and thus have no opportunity to take
Asian salmon that roam east of that line. The United States contends
that the primary objective of the treaty was to apply the principle of
abstention to the entire stock of salmon originating in North America
and therefore the line should be so located that the Japanese will ab-
stain from catching any American spawned salmon. At the same time
the United States realizes that the abstention principle should not be
interpreted so rigidly that Japan will be prevented from continuing her
historical fishery for Asian salmon.7"
Further ambiguity results from the phrase in the protocol stating
that the new line shall be located where it can be shown "beyond a
reasonable doubt"75 that it would more equitably divide such salmon
than the provisional lines. It is curious that the phrase "beyond a
reasonable doubt" should be used, because in American jurisprudence
it is generally used to describe that exceptionally high degree of proof
" See, e.g., INPFC, REPORT OF U.S. SEC. MEETING, supra note 71, at 9.
" This is the phrase that appears in the English "official version" of the treaty.
In Anglo-American jurisprudence this phrase is a "term of art" and has a very
special and widely known meaning. The Japanese "official version" appears to be
a literal translation of the English version, and is not a "term of art" with any
special meaning in Japanese law, according to Professor Dan F. Henderson (Direc-
tor of the Law of Asian Countries Program at the University of Washington
School of Law). This suggests that the phrase probably appeared first in an English
draft, and then was simply (and literally) translated into Japanese. It would also
suggest that one of the most important sources of meaning for the term would be
American law.
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required for conviction in criminal cases.76 Such a burden would seem
to be almost impossible to carry in the North Pacific salmon fisheries
issue. Not only are the commissioners confronted with the ambiguity
of the phrase "more equitably divide," but they must face a profusion
of scientific unknowns about the nature and habits of the salmon and
the impact on various stocks of different fishing techniques and inten-
sities. These unknowns are amply illustrated in the reports of the
tripartite Commission itself, as well as elsewhere. 7 It is not surprising
that the Commission has been unable to determine a new line or lines
to replace the existing provisional line.
True, if the Commission fails to agree upon a new line within a
reasonable time, the matter is to be referred to a special committee of
scientists from neutral countries. However, this special committee of
scientists must also labor under the protocol's ambiguous language.
United States sources have also objected to Japan's high seas fishing
effort beyond longitude 175' W. on grounds relating to wastefulness of
the resource. Their arguments are threefold: (1) that the high seas
fishery takes immature salmon; (2) that the high seas fishery makes
biological control more difficult; and (3) that excessive numbers of
salmon are injured and drop out of the nets during high seas gill-
netting.78
" In general, three different degrees of proof are used in American jurispru-
dence: (1) for ordinary civil litigation (proof by a preponderance of the evidence);
(2) for civil litigation in which fraud is alleged (clear, cogent and convincing
proof) ; and (3) criminal cases (proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Although much
debate exists about the exact nature and definition of these three degrees of proof,
there is agreement that the burden of proof in criminal cases (beyond a reasonable
doubt) is more difficult to carry than the other two. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497
(1940); cf., B. JoNEs, EvIDENCE § 227 (1958). One writer has compared them as (a)
probably is true, (b) what highly probably is true, or (c) what almost certainly is
true. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAx.i. L. REv. 242 (1944).
Applying this language to the issue of locating a new line to replace the present
"provisional" line, the test might look like this:
A reasonable doubt exists where after a comparison and consideration of all the
evidence the minds of the commissioners are not convinced that it is almost
certain that the new line will "more equitably divide" the salmon than the
existing provisional line.
"See, e.g., INPFC, REPORT OF U.S. SEc. MEETiNG, supra note 71; S. ODA, supra
note 71.
' These arguments were recently presented in PAc. FISHERMAN, Dec. 1965, at 9,
by Clarence Pautzke, Chairman of the American Section of the Tripartite Fisheries
Commission. He said:
The Japanese high seas fishery is causing great difficulty to the conservation
program of the U.S. Furthermore, the high seas fishery in 8 of the past 10 years
has had a severely adverse economic effect upon the inshore fishery on Bristol
Bay.
The high seas fishery of Japan seeks Sockeye in the corridor between 175
degrees west longitude and 170 degrees east longitude when they have largely
separated from Asian salmon. A high seas fishery is unselective on salmon...
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Studies by United States and Canadian scientists demonstrate that
the taking of immature fish is wasteful because it does not allow these
fish to continue growing until they return to territorial waters where
they would gain substantially in weight and thus increase the total
yield of salmon available to man.7" An estimated 20.8 percent are
immatures at the time they are caught,0 i.e., they would not return
to their spawning streams until one year later. When these fish are
caught on the high seas they have no opportunity to gain their full
weight and it is lost. This argument is rejected by some Japanese who
suggest that most of the salmon caught by their high seas fishery
would, in any event, probably return to United States territorial waters
within a few weeks and that the loss through natural mortality may
be greater than the size-of-fish loss during this period.' In any event
they argue that scientific evidence is lacking to decide the argument
either way." One Japanese author goes so far as to suggest that
and thus may overfish weak races, the bulk of which should be reserved for
spawning. On the other hand, strong races, with a large catchable surplus might
be under-harvested by a high seas fishery. Conservation of the resource depends
upon fishing these races selectively, according to their strength, as is done in the
inshore fishery.
A high seas fishery is destructive and wasteful. As much as 30% of the fish
caught in ocean gillnets drop out of the net before it is retrieved, and do not
survive .... The high seas fishery catches the salmon while they are still feeding
and growing rapidly, before full growth is attained. In contrast, the inshore
fishery harvest the fish when they are mature and segregated into component
runs.
But see French, Dropout Rate for High Seas Gillnets Studied by U.S. Fisheries
Biologists, PAc. FISHERMAN, March 1965, at 10, where the most recent investigations
on the dropout rate proved inconclusive.
" See 1965 INPFC, ANN. REP. 99:
For Sockeye, chum, and pink salmon of commercial size, an accumulating body
of evidence now indicates that increases in stock weight from growth of
individuals continue to exceed the losses in stock weight from natural mortality
until mature fish reach both the North American and Asian coasts .... The
general conclusion is that pelagic fishing reduces potential yields.
See also Ricker, Comparison of Ocean Growth and Mortality of Sockeye Salmon
During Their Last Two Years, 19 J. FISHERIES RESEARCH BD. CAN. 531-60 (1961).
'°This figure of 20.8 is the estimate of Mr. R. A. Fredin, Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries, and is the estimated average for the period 1956-1965. His figures were
based on the assumption that all Bristol Bay sockeye caught in the following areas
and time periods were immature:
170°E-1750 W July 1 thru end of season
175°E-180°W June 21-30.
Admittedly the degree of accuracy of this assumption has not been fully tested. This
data supplied the author by private communication from R. A. Fredin, May, 1967.
They may also be found in Alaska Dep't of Fish and Game Information Leaflet No.
82, Table No. 3, June 15, 1966.
" See U.S. Bur. of Comm. Fish., Japan's Northern Water Resources Research
Council's Comments on Van Cleve & Johnson's lanagement of High Seas Fisheries
of the Northern Pacific, Oct. 1964, at 6, 7, 10, 11.
T. MATSUSHITA, supra note 45, at 17; U.S. Bur. of Comm. Fish., Japanese Press
Transl. [Nippon Suisan Shinbun, Feb. 11, 1957]-summary of remarks by Dr. Moi-
seev (Russia) and Dr. Fujinaga (Japan). United States sources admit that "definitive
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"from the standpoint of effective utilization of resources, it is desirable
to conduct" both offshore and coastal fisheries, because the total ton-
nage of fish caught year after year might be higher by such a com-
bination.8"
To the argument that the high seas fishery makes biological control
more difficult, the Japanese answer that in the "coastal fisheries of the
United States and Canada, it is very common... to utilize mixed
stocks of fish and to capture fish in waters far distant from their
spawning grounds,' 8 4 and that therefore the United States has little
cause to criticize the Japanese high seas fishery on these grounds. It
would seem too obvious for argument that control of escapement can
best be accomplished at or very near the mouth of the spawning
streams. Only at this point can one be sure that the fish that are
caught, or permitted to escape, are of a single stock, headed for a
particular river. Nonetheless the Japanese claim they are "substan-
tially" selective in their high seas catch, and that is all that is re-
quired. 5 That the United States fishermen sometimes catch salmon
far from their spawning streams also cannot be denied. Yet there is
obvious validity to the argument that as between the two fisheries, i.e.,
the United States coastal fishery or the Japanese high seas fishery,
research techniques are not yet available" for handling certain problems, but argue
that "direct proof is seldom if ever available to support the assumptions required in
estimating natural mortality." They also criticized certain Japanese experiments
which tended to prove that which was obviously untrue, i.e., that the Pacific salmon
had no natural mortality at all. See 1966 INPFC ANN. REP. (Investigations by the
United States, U.S. Bur. Com. Fish. draft submitted for future publication).
m T. MATSUSHITA, stpra note 45, at 19.
s
tSee U.S. Bur. of Comm. Fish., supra note 81, at 8:
The United States scientists, for example, point out with respect to the migra-
tion of salmon to the Alaska Peninsula, Southeastern Alaska, Prince William
Sound, and Puget Sound waters that "the salmon from individual river systems
are complexly intermingled in the fishery and so it is impossible to separate
them according to specific systems." (INPFC Bulletin No. 10, 1962, pp. 83, 85,
86, 88, etc.) Furthermore, the number of concerned river systems in those areas
are innumerable. Again, to quote that report "The Prince William Sound pink
salmon fishery harvests mixed runs to about 200 streams (ibid., p. 82) the South-
eastern Alaska pink salmon fishery mixed runs to several hundred systems
(ibid., p. 86) the Kodiak Island pink salmon fishery the mixed runs to numerous
systems (ibid., p. 85) and the pink salmon fishery, extending from Puget Sound
to British Columbia, also harvests runs to many different systems'." In this
manner, the pink salmon fisheries of the United States and Canada are catching
mixed stocks of fish originating from many different systems-that is, apart
from the discussion that a migratory group of fish to one system consists of
several stocks, such as the upstream-spawning stock and the intertidal-zone
spawning stock-and the actual situation is far different from the claims
made ... that the coastal fisheries are separately harvesting individual stocks of
fish at the river mouths or in nearby waters.
IT. MATSUSHITA, supra note 45, at 16. The Japanese high seas salmon fishery is
controlled by the Japan Fisheries Agency which regulates the number of licenses
quantities of fish taken each year, and permissible areas of fishing.
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the former, being closer to the mouths of the spawning streams, has a
better chance of accurately sorting out and regulating different stocks.
To be sure, it is a question of degree, and the United States approach
could undoubtedly be improved upon, so far as biological control is
concerned, by requiring all fishing to be carried out at or very near
the mouths of spawning streams, although this might impose other
costs on the fishing industry (travel time, etc.) that would make such
a procedure undesirable.
The United States also argues that more salmon are injured and
drop out of the Japanese gillnets on the high seas than in the United
States coastal gillnet fishery. The reason for the difference is alleged
to be the amount of time the gillnets are left in the water before they
are picked up. In the coastal fishery United States fishermen usually
leave their nets in the water no more than 2 or 3 hours. In the Japa-
nese high seas gillnet fishery, the logistics involved in handling and
positioning catcher boats, and the larger nets apparently require the
nets to be left in place for longer periods of 6 to 10 hours. A recent
study by United States scientists tends to prove that the dropout rate
is about 4 percent when the nets are in the water from 2 to 1 hour, 21
percent after 22 hours, and 30 to 35 percent over a period of 62 to
11Y2 hours.8 0 These are significant differences which would tend to
suggest a more frequent tending of the nets, whether on the high seas
or in coastal waters. Also there is some evidence that mature fish
caught in estuaries withstand injury better than either immature fish or
mature fish caught on the high seas.
The United States also claims that excessive Japanese fishing is
depleting the stocks of Bering Sea salmon. The Japanese answer that
the United States has not yet demonstrated that more intensive ex-
ploitation of the salmon stocks would not result in an increased sus-
tainable yield. This argument is based on their hypothesis that the
long-term average yield from a salmon stock is primarily controlled
by natural factors, and that fishing plays a relatively minor role."
Furthermore, the Japanese argue that if the United States wants to
assure a certain escapement, "all" it needs to do is curtail its own
fishermen more. Thus if the proper escapement for a particular stock
is 30 percent, and the Japanese take 30 percent, the inshore United
States fishery could properly take up to 40 percent. The more the
1966 INPFC ANN. REP. (Investigations by the United States, Bur. Com. Fish.;
draft submitted for future publication).
s' INPFC, REPORT OF U.S. SEC. MEETING, supra note 71, at 16.
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Japanese take, the less are available to United States fishermen, as-
suming the escapement percentage remains the same.88 Of course one
logical (and absurd) result from this argument might be that the
United States would end up with nothing but the management of the
resource, taking no fish whatsoever, leaving the total harvest to the
Japanese.
IV. T m ABSTENTION PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Detailed studies of the principle of abstention have been made else-
where."9 I shall trace its history only briefly here.
The United States view is that abstention should apply to "situa-
tions where states have, through the expenditure of time, effort and
money on research and management, and through restraints on their
fishermen, increased and maintained the productivity of stocks of
fish, which without such action would not exist or would exist at far
below their most productive level." Under these conditions, "when
the stocks are being fully utilized, that is, under such exploitation
that an increase in the amount of fishing would not be expected to
result in any substantial increase in the sustainable yield, then states
not participating, or which have not in recent years participated in
exploitation of such stocks of fish, excepting the coastal state adjacent
to the waters in which the stocks occur, should be required to abstain
from participation.""0
As the originator and the chief proponent of the abstention prin-
ciple, it is understandable that the United States would recommend its
adoption at the 1955 Rome Conference and at the 1958 and 1960
Geneva Conferences. The Rome Conference declined to indorse the
principle, merely describing it as an "existing procedure" which at-
tempted to deal with the problem of new entrants into a fishery where
the maximum sustainable yield was already being taken. The confer-
ence observed that under conditions where the maximum yield was
being taken, and where research and regulation were designed to
develop and maintain the fishery, then the "participation of additional
states in the exploitation of the resources will yield no increase in
I' T. MATSUSHiTA, supra note 45, at 19.1G. AmA.oR, THE ExPLoITATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE REsouRcEs 69
(1959); D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF FISHERIES 275-97 (1965); R. Van
Cleve & R. Johnson, Management of the High Seas Fisheries of the Northeastern
Pacific 1 (Univ. of Wash. Pub. in Fisheries New Series, Vol. II, No. 2, 1963);
Van Cleve, The Economic and Scientific Basis of the Principle of Abstention, 1 U.N.
Conf. on Law of the Sea at 47, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/3 (1958).
" G. AMADOR, supra note 89.
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food to mankind, but will threaten the success of the conservation
program." In its "general conclusions" the conference suggested that
where additional entrants into the fishery posed serious problems, the
states involved should agree to submit the question to "suitably qual-
ified and impartial experts chosen for the special case by the parties
concerned .... ,"1
The United States subsequently recommended the abstention prin-
ciple to the International Law Commission [hereinafter cited as ILC]
which was assigned the task of preparing draft conventions on the law
of the sea for consideration by the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences.
The United States argued that abstention was somewhat analogous to
the "unjust enrichment" principle in United States municipal (in-
ternal) law which dictates that a party through whose efforts and
money an industry or a property has been developed, should not be
deprived of that industry or property by someone who has made no
contribution to the development.92
During the discussions of the drafts of the ILC it was observed that
other special situations might exist which would tend to support the
granting of exclusive rights of exploitation, e.g., where an important
economic activity within a state was clearly dependent upon a certain
species inhabiting the neighboring waters, as in the Peru-Chile situa-
tion involving the biological cycle "anchovy-guano-fertilizer-agricul-
tural produce."93
The International Law Commission declined to recommend the
adoption of the abstention principle, but did describe it in the com-
mentary to the final draft convention on the law of the sea, noting
that: 04
both this proposal, the purpose of which was to encourage the building up
or restoration of the productivity of resources, and the proposals of some
other governments, based on the concept of vital economic necessity,
reflect problems and interests which deserve recognition in international
law. However, lacking the necessary competence in the scientific and
economic domains to study these exceptional situations adequately, the
Commission, while drawing attention to the problem, refrained from
making concrete proposals.
At the 1958 Geneva Conference the abstention principle was dis-
91 See generally D. JOHNSTON, supra note 89.
12 Id. at 292.
" Id.
" Id. at 293.
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cussed at length, but was ultimately opposed by the Soviet Union,
Japan, France, Britain, and many others. Their arguments were in
summary, that: it was a distribution scheme rather than a conserva-
tion measure; it discriminated in favor of the developed nations,
and against the developing nations; it conflicted with the principle of
freedom of the seas; if applied generally it would be subject to much
abuse by nations claiming incorrectly that certain fisheries had been
developed to a certain level of yield by their sole efforts; its general
application was unrealistic because of the lack of adequate study of
biological, technological and political elements involved in its applica-
tion.9"5
The "Third Committee" of the Geneva Conference, to which the
abstention principle was assigned for consideration, approved a resolu-
tion which would "commend the abstention procedure to States for
utilization where appropriate as an incentive to the development and
restoration of the productivity of living resources of the sea; "96 how-
ever, this resolution failed by a small margin to attract sufficient sup-
port to be adopted in plenary sessionY7
To date the Tripartite Treaty is the only fishery treaty in which
this principle has been adopted. Whether it will become a more widely
accepted principle in international law, or remain uniquely a product of
the North Pacific, remains to be seen.
The abstention principle is, after all, merely a special case of historic
rights,9 8 and historic rights have not served as the basis for any
widespread rule of exclusivity in international law. At the Geneva
Conference this principle was recognized as a proper basis of tempo-
rary exclusivity, on a phasing out basis, i.e., the nation claiming his-
toric rights in certain circumstances, would have an exclusive right to
a given fishery only for a temporary phasing out period, at the end of
which all exclusive rights would terminate.99 It was not accepted as a
basis for a permanent right of exclusivity.
0 Id. at 293-94.
M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 959-60 (1962).
w Id.
'See Allen, supra note 45. Mr. Edward W. Allen, former chairman of the
INPFC, says that during the formative period of the Tripartite Treaty the United
States talked about the historic rights concept in order to protect her fisheries from
high seas exploitation by the Japanese. The Japanese objected to this language, thus
the word "abstain" was used in the treaty to describe the Japanese restraint in
certain historic areas. The concept was a "split-off" from "historic rights." See
also discussion of historic rights and abstention in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Aug. 30, 1963, at 10, col. 1.
'This rule was nearly adopted at the 1960 Conference where Canada and the
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V. ABSTENTION IN THE NORTH PACIFIC
Although the abstention principle was not officially endorsed at
Rome or Geneva a substantial minority of the delegates approved the
principle for consideration under "special circumstances." To find
those special circumstances each situation must be examined on its
own facts, and this means a study in depth of relevant biological,
economic, social and political factors. Such a study is beyond the
scope of this paper; however I shall attempt briefly here to review
some of the features of the North Pacific and Bering Sea salmon
fishery that have been at the center of the abstention debates between
Japan and the United States.
One of these special features is the spawning habits of salmon.
Salmon spawn in fresh water rivers and streams, often hundreds or
even thousands of miles from the sea. After birth they often travel
several weeks to reach the ocean; then after spending between 1 and 5
years on the high seas they return to their original spawning streams to
propagate and die. Spokesmen for the United States have argued that
this peculiar characteristic of the salmon tends to make this fishery
appropriate for abstention. They argue that without the use of United
States rivers and streams these stocks of fish could not exist. (The
Japanese have only minor runs of salmon that spawn in their home
islands, and thus primarily take Soviet spawned or United States
spawned salmon on the high seas.) Some of the more ardent propo-
nents of abstention from the United States have tended to express
their arguments in terms of legal ownership, i.e., that the United States
has a "vested property right" in the salmon that spawn in our rivers
"the same as the merchant ships that ply the high seas," and, it has
been argued, that for a nonowner to harvest these fish is as much an
United States proposed an exclusive 6-mile fishery zone with a further 6-mile zone
of special fishery rights, subject to a right to phase out fishermen from other nations
who had exploited the outer 6-mile zone for 10 years or more (later amended to 5
years). This Canada-United States proposal received 45 votes for, 33 against, and 7
abstentions, enough for a strong showing of support, but not for adoption. Mr.
Gardia Amador, the widely respected Cuban delegate, suggested that the state claim-
ing historic rights should have preferential status over all other nonfishing nations
except the coastal state which was said to have a "special interest" in the fishery.
Thus, if it were necessary to impose conservtaion restrictions for the area, the
nationals of the coastal state and the state possessing historic rights should both be
accorded the same preferential treatment over foreign fishermen during the interim,
phaseout period. Subsequently, several nations have taken unilateral action (Canada)
or have engaged in treaties (Great Britain, Iceland, Japan, South Korea) reflecting
principles similar to those proposed in the Canada-United States proposal. The
basis of the phasing out operation was to allow the noncoastal state time to relocate
its fishermen and vessels. See generally, D. JOHNSTON, supra note 89, at 282-88, 301.
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act of piracy as an interference with shipping on the high seas.'00
Although such claims have little standing in international law'0' they
do indicate the strength of feeling attached to the issue by some of the
abstention proponents.
Another difficulty with the spawning stream-ownership concept is
the alleged inconsistent position of the United States vis-h.-vis Canada.
Under the 1937 Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Ex-
tension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System,
the United States became entitled to harvest some 50 percent of the
Fraser River salmon runs.102 As the Fraser is a Canadian river it could
be argued that these fish belonged to the Canadians and that United
States participation in the fishery is inconsistent with that ownership. 03
Also, the recent disagreement between Canada and the United States
in the Noyes Island area is relevant. Noyes Island is part of Alaska.
Both Canada and the United States claim "historic rights" to the runs
of salmon that pass near this island on their way to spawn in distant
Canadian rivers. The Canadians have argued that the United States
is inconsistent in claiming a right to fish for Canadian spawned salmon
See Address by Lloyd A. Royal, Director of the International Pacific Salmon
Fishery Commission, Salmon Are Property as Much As Ships, in PAc. FiSHERMAN,
Feb. 1965, at 11.
Other claims of legal ownership have been made in the past. In 1938 a Senate bill
(S. 2679, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938)) was introduced declaring: "2. The salmon which
are spawned and hatched in the waters of Alaska are hereby declared to be the
property of the United States ... !~' 83 CONG. Rzc. 2622 (1938).
prPFor the most part, spokesmen for the United States have declined to make such
claims, realizing that they have little support in international law. When claims of
ownership have been made they have often been criticized for doing a disservice to
this country's basic position. See PAc. FISHERMAN, Feb. 1966, at 1, criticizing a
Tmiz magazine editorial (Jan. 28, 1966) which spoke in terms of property rights in
salmon. Mr. Edward W. Allen former Chairman of the INPFC has also criticized
such claims of ownership.
A similar claim of ownership was raised by the United States in the fur seal
arbitration of 1893 where this country sought to exclude British Columbian vessels
from high seas fur sealing. These seals return each year to the place of their birth
on the Pribilof Islands to bear their young. Between these visits they, like the salmon,
roam vast distances across the open seas. The arbitral tribunal held that the United
States has no property or ownership rights in the fur seals outside the three mile
territorial sea. See D. JOHNSTON, supra note 89, at 206-07.
The Geneva Conferences of 1958 and 1960 declined to recognize any claims to
ownership to high seas fishery resources; on the contrary these conferences affirmed
the freedom of high seas fishing concept in the 1958 Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.13/L.54.
" Convention for Protection, Preservation and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon
Fisheries in the Fraser River System, May 26, 1930, 184 L.N.T.S., at 305.
" A counter argument is, of course, possible. It can be argued that the Canadians
"own" the salmon and that for reasons of their own they have agreed to share their
salmon with United States fishermen. Similarly it could be argued that the Russians
"own" the salmon that spawn in Soviet streams, but for other reasons have agreed to
share these fish with the Japanese, under the 1956 Japan-U.S.S.R. International
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the Northwest Pacific Ocean, Oct. 19,
1956, 263 U.N.T.S. No. 3768, at 99. However, if these treaties were based on a con-
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while at the same time objecting to Japanese high seas fishing for
United States spawned salmon.1"4 There are a number of distinctions,
however. The United States has for years harvested these fish which
pass through its 3-mile territorial waters, and did so before the Cana-
dians considered them "Canadian" fish. Certainly none of the North
American spawned salmon ever pass anywhere near the territorial
waters of Japan. Moreover, in the Noyes Island fishery, tagging results
indicate that the Canadians take a comparable amount of Alaska
spawned fish.
Some Japanese argue that the abstention principle is contrary to the
concept of freedom of the high seas, and is similar to the widely
rejected notion of "acquisitive prescription." Although the Japanese
recognize the need for regulation toward conservation, 05 they believe
the freedom of high seas fishing argument supports their "equal treat-
ment" position, i.e., that they should be entitled to share equally with
the United States in the salmon resources of the high seas. Also, while
admitting that salmon spawn in United States rivers, they point out
that some 95 percent of the weight of these fish is put on while they
are beyond United States territorial waters.
Spokesmen for the United States have seldom argued that abstention
is based on the concept of historic fishing rights,' ° probably because
the current practice of nations suggests this only justifies exclusive
rights for a limited time and not permanently. 1 7 As noted previously
cept of sharing an "owned" resource one would expect to find a declaration of owner-
ship, and a recitation of the purpose of sharing this "owned" resource somewhere
in these treaties. Such declarations are not to be found, nor do the reports on the
negotiations of the treaties indicate that the parties believed they were dealing with
an owned resource. At least there is no evidence of an understanding between the
parties that the fish were owned by the nation on whose territory the spawning stream
is found. There are, of course, occasional unilateral statements by one individual or
another that the salmon are owned. Such declarations do not, however, constitute
international law.
"' See Seattle Times, May 3, 1966, at 1, col. 305; id., at 38, col. 1-2; Seattle Times,
May 20, 1966, at 1, col. 3-6; id. April 22, 1966, at 48, col. 1 ; Seattle Post-Intelligencer
May 26, 1966, at 39, col. 4-5.
"'
0 See S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES 90 (1962); see also
H. AIKAWA, FISHERY BIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FISHERIES 6, 8, 18
(U.S. Bur. Com. Fish. Transl. Ser. No. 19, July 24, 1958).
Mr. Takeshi Yasukawa, speaking for Japan at the 12th North Pacific Fisheries
Commission meeting in Seattle, Nov. 12, 1965 said:
The principle of freedom of high seas fishery does not justify unrestricted
exploitation of marine resources. Rather it means that these resources-a com-
mon property of mankind-are open for utilization to all nations and all peoples,
and that no country is entitled to fence-off any of such resources, denying other
countries an opportunity for their utilization.
It is admitted that one who makes use of such resources is in duty bound to
exercise resource conservation. The importance of conservation of resources
cannot be over-emphasized.
' See D. JOHNSTON, supra note 89, at 300-01, 446-47.
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the historic fishing rights concept received some support at the 1958
Geneva Conference, but only on a phasing out basis. 0 s
On the other hand, the United States has argued that it has regu-
lated and restrained its own fishermen for more than 50 years for the
purpose of maintaining and in some cases rebuilding the salmon runs,
and that this regulation and restraint should entitle it to a certain
exclusivity with regard to salmon.0 9 The Japanese counter by saying
that this restraint would, again, entitle the United States to exclusive
rights only for a temporary period, not permanently. Further, they
argue that if restraint is the criteria then the "Japanese fishermen, who
have totally abstained from salmon fishing east of 1750 west longitude
for over ten years ought now be granted the right to share propor-
tionately in the harvest since they have substantially contributed to
the conservation of those resources." (Japan, by practicing abstention,
has lost the profits she would have otherwise gained, and in this sense
has borne conservation expenses.) 0
The United States also claims exclusive rights to the salmon resource
because of the hundreds of millions of dollars that have been spent for
pollution control, fish ladders, and other efforts to protect the salmon
resource, because of the extensive investment in fish hatcheries and
artificial propagation that has been made by this country,"' and be-
cause of the comprehensive salmon research program carried on in
this country. The Japanese counter that United States efforts at pollu-
tion control, fish ladders, and artificial propagation should, indeed,
give the United States certain special rights, but only commensurate
with their investment, and only with regard to those stocks of fish
s Id. at 282-88.
' The United States argument is, of course, based on the fact that the United
States had a capacity to catch more fish during this period, but voluntarily restrained
itself from doing so in order to conserve the salmon for future use, and toward a
maximum sustainable yield. Thus it would not be possible to argue, under this
approach, that the French, or Swiss, also would be entitled to share in the resource
because they too "restrained" themselves from fishing for salmon. There is no
evidence that they had an active capacity to take them, thus no "restraint" occurred.
u0 See U.S. Bur. Com. Fish., Japan's Northern Water Resources Research
Council's Comments on Van Cleve & Johnson's Management of the High Seas
Fisheries of the Northeastern Pacific, Oct. 1964, at 5.
1 A reported $225 million has been spent for conservation of Columbia River
salmon. About $2 million per year is spent for hatcheries. PAc. FISHERMAN, Feb.
1965, at 11. In addition, the United States has spent over $18 million for manage-
ment and research on Alaska salmon. Van Cleve, The Economic and Scientific Basis
of the Principle of Abstention, 1 U.N. Conf. on Law of Sea 47, 59, para. 84, U.N. Doc.
A/CoNF.13/3 (1958). The capital construction cost of each fish passage facility
ranges from $6 million to $36 million. See Marts, Evaluation of the Fishing Indus-
try and Fish-Preservation Facilities: The Columbia River Case, in THE FISHERIES:
PROBLEMS OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (J. Crutchfield ed. 1965).
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affected by those measures. 12 Virtually none of these activities has
been necessary for Alaskan rivers and streams and thus this argument
has little weight there. (The evidence available indicates that the
Japanese catch only Alaska spawned salmon on the high seas.) One
exception is the research expenditure; these have been substantially
aimed at the Alaskan salmon stocks. Presumably the Japanese would
concede these should give the United States "some" special equity in
the Alaskan runs.
Lastly the Japanese argue that the United States has failed to meet
the abstention conditions in that it has failed to prove that "more
intensive exploitation of the stock will not provide a substantial in-
crease in yield which can be sustained year after year.""' The Japa-
nese apparently base their scientific arguments "on the hypothesis that
the long term average yield from a salmon stock is primarily con-
trolled by natural factors, and that fishing plays a relatively minor
role.' 1 4
VI. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON FISHING
If the Tripartite Treaty is abrogated what would be the effect of the
1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the Sea?
So long as the Tripartite Treaty remains in effect, the Geneva Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
Sea". will have no application to the salmon conflict in the North
Pacific and Bering Sea. However, given the intensity of feeling on
both sides of the Pacific it is possible that one of the parties to the
Tripartite Treaty will terminate it under the one year termination
clause. In such an event it would be useful to know what legal regime
would probably prevail, and what effect the Geneva Fishing Conven-
tion might have on the relationship of Japan and the United States.
The Geneva Convention went into effect on March 20, 1966116 and
1
2 See U.S. Bur. Com. Fish., note 110 supra.
"Tripartite Treaty, art. IV, para. 1 (b) (i).
114 INPFC, REPORT OF U.S. SEC. MEETING, March 1960, 16 (U.S. Bur. Comm. Fish.
Cir. No. 85, May 1960).
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Se,-, April 28. 1958, adopted by United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea,
U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/L.54. [hereinafter cited as 1958 Geneva Convention on Living
Resources of the High Seas].
"'The Convention became effective 30 days after the 22d ratification. The 22
ratifying nations include: United States, Australia, Columbia, Dominican Repub-
lic, Finland, Haiti, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yugoslavia,
South Africa, Cambodia, Malaysia, Senegal, Malagasy Republic, Uganda, Malawi,
Upp.er Volta, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Jamaica.
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has been ratified by the United States, although not by Japan. Without
Japanese ratification Japanese fishermen could legally fish for salmon
anywhere outside the United States 12-mile exclusive fishery zone, and
could take as many salmon as they deemed appropriate. On the other
hand if Japan ratifies the convention, or otherwise accepts its terms,
then she would have to negotiate with the United States and Canada
toward the establishment of an overall quota of salmon to be harvested
each year. The convention would not, however, provide any criteria
for deciding which fishermen caught the fish. Thus the fishermen of
each nation would simply catch as many fish as possible up to the
overall quota. Needless to say, the United States fishermen would
almost certainly take a share of salmon smaller than at present." 7
Article IV of the Convention on Fishing provides that when the
nationals of two nations are both engaged in fishing the same stock of
fish on the high seas either may require the other to engage in negotia-
tions with a view to prescribing the necessary conservation measures
for the resource affected." 8 This article also provides that if the states
do not reach agreement within 12 months either may initiate proceed-
ings for arbitration" 9 by a 5-member "special commission" under
article IX.'20 Also, if the United States is deemed a coastal state with
U The suggestion has been made privately in American quarters that if the
Japanese continue to insist upon taking a larger share of the salmon, the Americans
should deliberately overfish the stocks until they are reduced to a size that would
put the Japanese out of business. After foreign fishermen were out of operation,
the Americans might reach some agreement with them to reserve the fishery exclu-
sively for United States citizens. Needless to say, such a course of action poses
serious economic risks to the United States fishing industry and is not likely to be
taken.
n' 1958 Geneva Convention on Living Resources of the High Seas, art. 4, § 1:
If the nationals of two or more States are engaged in fishing in the same stock
or stocks of fish or other living marine resources in any area or areas of the
high seas, these States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into negotiations
with a view to prescribing by agreement for their nationals the necessary
measures for the conservation of the living resources affected.
"' Id. § 2:
If the States concerned do not reach agreement within twelve months, any of the
parties may initiate the procedure contemplated by article 9.
" Id. art. 9:
1. Any dispute which may arise between States under articles 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8
shall, at the request of any of the parties, be submitted for settlement to a special
commission of five members, unless the parties agree to seek a solution by
another method of peaceful settlement, as provided for in Article 33 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
2. The members of the commission, one of whom shall be designated as chairman,
shall be named by agreement between the States in dispute within three months
of the request for settlement in accordance with the provisions of this article.
Failing agreement they shall, upon the request of any State party, be named by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within a further three-month
period, in consultation with the States in dispute and with the President of the
International Court of Justice and the Director-General of the Food and Agri-
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regard to the high seas salmon fishery, under article VII,12' then it can
insist that Japan engage in negotiations, and if these negotiations do
not produce agreement within 6 months the United States "may...
adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate ... [to the
salmon in the] ... area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea."
This approach raises the question whether the salmon in the mid-
Bering Sea and mid-Pacific are in the "high seas adjacent to [the
United States] territorial sea." The convention can only provide a
temporary answer, until a voluntary agreement is reached, or until
settlement by arbitration could be arrived at under article IX. Fur-
thermore, these unilateral conservation measures cannot "discriminate
... against foreign fishermen"; that is, foreign fishermen must be
permitted to fish on equal terms with the fishermen from the coastal
state.
Thus the critical question-who is to catch the salmon-would not
be resolved by the Geneva Convention, although conceivably it might
control the overall fishing effort toward conservation and management
of the resource.
VIl. SOUTH KOREA AND THE SALMON FISHERY
One of the striking new developments in high seas salmon fishing is
the potential entry of South Korea into the fishery. This may have
substantial impact on Japanese-United States fishery relations. During
culture Organization of the United Nations, from amongst well-qualified per-
sons being nationals of States not involved in the dispute and specializing in
legal, administrative or scientific questions relating to fisheries, depending upon
the nature of the dispute to be settled. Any vacancy arising after the original
appointment shall be filled in the same manner as provided for in the initial
selection.
3. Any State party to proceedings under these articles shall have the right to
name one of its nationals to the special commission, with the right to participate
fully in the proceedings on the same footing as a member of the commission, but
without the right to vote or to take part in the writing of the commission's
decision.
4. The Commission shall determine its own procedure, assuring each party to
the proceedings a full opportunity to be heard and to present its case. It shall
also determine how the costs and expenses shall be divided between the parties to
the dispute, failing agreement by the parties on this matter.
5. The special commission shall render its decision within a period of five
months from the time it is appointed unless it decides, in case of necessity, to
extend the time limit for a period not exceeding three months.
6. The special commission shall, in reaching its decisions, adhere to these arti-
cles and to any special agreements between the disputing parties regarding
settlement of the dispute.
7. Decisions of the commission shall be by majority vote.
1 Id. art. 7, § 1 :
Having regard to the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 6, any coastal State
may, with a view to the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources
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1966, six South Korean vessels fished experimentally for salmon near
Hokkaido.'22 To date none are reported to have taken any North
American spawned salmon either in the North Pacific or Bering Sea;
however this possibility exists and is causing considerable concern in
the United States.
South Korea is planning a major expansion of its fishing industry
within the next few years. One report indicates a planned construction
of 572 fishing vessels under the current three year plan; 259 of these
would be built in Japan. Financing for this construction was planned
to total about $190 million-$100 million from the total $300 million
in reparations owed South Korea by Japan, plus $90 million from the
fisheries assistance fund which Japan agreed to provide to South
Korea under the normalization agreement recently concluded between
both countries.'23 More recent reports indicate that the $90 million
from the Japanese assistance fund has been made unavailable because
of the Japanese Government's decision not to approve loans for con-
struction of vessels which might be used in the high seas salmon
fishery. Some of this money was to have been used for an 8000 ton
mothership from Japan and some 35 catcher vessels. 24
The Japanese Government has also taken other actions to discourage
South Korean entry into the high seas salmon fishery; for example, it
is reported to have denied passports to some 21 Japanese fishermen
who were under contract with a South Korean firm to act as tech-
nicians'25 and for a time it was considering the denial of port calls by
Korean fishing boats. 2 There has also been agitation in Japan for
abandonment of its traditional three-mile territorial sea in favor of a
wider territorial sea, or a wider exclusive fishery zone in order to ex-
clude the Koreans from the area immediately around Japan. 2 7
These actions appear somewhat anomalous in view of the long stand-
of the sea, adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate to any stock of
fish or other marine resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its
territorial sea, provided that negotiations to that effect with other States con-
cerned have not led to an agreement within six months.
ITHE ORIENTAL EcONOMIST, Nov. 1966, at 660.
'See U.S. Bur. Com. Fish., Foreign Fishery Information Release No. 65-21,
Sept. 10, 1965, at 3 (Suisancho Nipp6, Sept. 3, 1965). For a comprehensive analysis
of this treaty and its effect on Japanese-Republic of Korea relations see Oda, The
Normalization of Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea, 61 A.J.I.L.
35-36 (1967); see generally G. WEISSBERG, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA AND THE JAPANESE-KOREAN FISHERY DisPuTE (1966).
'U.S. Bur. Com. Fish., Foreign Fishery Information Release No. 66-30, Dec.
2, 1966, at 3 (Suisan Keizai Shimbun, Nov. 30, 1966).
Id., No. 67-5, Feb. 16, 1967, at 3 (Minato Shinbun, Feb. 10, 1967).
THE ORIENTAL EcoNomIST, Nov. 1966, at 660.
'Id.
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ing position of Japan in favor of freedom of the seas. Japan has long
objected to United States restraints upon Japanese fishermen on the
high seas, claiming that because of lower pay scales and more efficient
operations Japanese fishermen can catch salmon cheaper than the
Americans, and that under a free enterprise system (which the United
States purports to espouse) the Japanese should be permitted to do so.
Thus if the United States fishermen cannot compete in such things as
efficiency and prices, they should turn their energies to some other
activity.' - Now Japan finds itself in the embarrassing position of
having to reverse itself. As stated by one source, "Now, by the irony
of fate, Japan is forced to completely reverse the course and take the
position formerly taken by... [the United States, Canada, and the
Soviet Union] ... and fight against 'intrusions' of South Korean fishing
boats."' 29 Needless to say, the new Japanese position poses some
hazards. It has been suggested that' 30
Japan is now in an extremely awkward position. If it demands for the
right to freely fish in northern waters, it has naturally to give the same
right to South Korea. If it tries to curb the advance of South Korea, it
will run the risk of being completely shut out of the northern waters by
the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union.
To make the matter worse, the fishing grounds in which South Korean
fishing boats are most active are those formerly dominated by Japan and
not by other countries. This tactic is just what Japan followed some
time ago vis-a-vis with other advanced fishing nations of the world.
South Korea is not bound by the abstention principle from fishing
for North American spawned salmon, although that country's close
relationship with, and economic dependence upon, the United States
suggest that it would give serious weight to United States objections to
its intervention in the North Pacific and Bering Sea salmon fishery.
Nonetheless such a possibility exists and cannot be discounted. Such
action might upset the precariously balanced relations of Japan, Can-
ada and the United States with regard to this fishery. Japan is already
aware that the Soviet Union will likely insist on reducing her salmon
catch quota by the amount of South Korea's catch within the Soviet-
" This view was expressed by Tomoyoshi Kamenaga, Japan Fisheries Agency
Production Division Chief, and Isamu Hoshimura, Nihon Suisan Director. Mr.
Kamenaga said: "I think everyone in the industry feels that the Japanese can catch fish
more efficiently." Mr. Yoshimura then added: "It would be wonderful if division of
labor in this world progresses to the point where, say, Japan catches the fish and the
other parties process them into final products." U.S. Bur. Com. Fish., Japanese Press
Transl. Aug. 27, 1964, at 3 (Suisan Kaizai Shinibun, Aug. 20, 1964).
" THE ORIENTAL EcoiloisT, Nov. 1966, at 660.
1,q Id.
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Japanese Convention waters, 18 1 and a stance along similar lines by the
United States would not seem unlikely.
VIII. CONCLUSION
What lessons for the future might be gleaned from the Japanese-
United States experience arising out of the negotiations for and opera-
tions of the Tripartite Treaty over the past 14 years; what improve-
ments might be incorporated into a new treaty regime? Without pre-
suming to design such a new treaty-which must necessarily be a
product of the total bargaining relationship of the three countries-I
would like to discuss some of the benefits to both sides, especially
concerning the management of the resource, that might occur from the
writing of a new agreement.
First, the issue of duress should be put to rest. Some Japanese
spokesmen continue to raise this issue, and it undoubtedly colors
Japanese attitudes toward the Tripartite Treaty and toward the United
States in current discussions. As explained above, whether Japan was
overreached during the 1952 negotiations is not at all clear. It should
be noted, however, that since June 10, 1963, Japan has had the legal
power to abrogate the treaty on one year's notice, and has voluntarily
chosen not to do so. If the treaty was in fact unfair, it would seem the
Japanese would, by now, have exercised their- legal right of termina-
tion. Their failure to do so indicates that the treaty has advantages
for them which they prefer not to give up, and further tends to
demonstrate the irrelevance, except for historical purposes, of the
duress issue in the context of the current debate.
That the Tripartite Treaty was negotiated on the basis of incomplete
scientific information is now obvious. The negotiators were, of course,
aware to a degree of their lack of knowledge, and thus somewhat
arbitrarily drew a line down the middle of the Bering Sea which they
assumed probably lay west of the area in which North American
spawned salmon could be found. Realizing the incompleteness of their
information, they attempted in the protocol to provide a method of
altering the treaty if and when better information became available.
This attempt failed because of failure to identify clearly the criteria
controlling such a change. If the criteria had been adequately iden-
tified then the Commission, which was charged with the initial treaty
modification responsibility, might have been able to change the agree-
'U.S. Bur. Com. Fish., Foreign Fishery Information Release No. 67-5, Feb.
16, 1967, at 2-3 (Suisan Ts-ishin, Jan. 13, 1967).
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ment as required. Even the difficulties posed by the ambiguities in the
protocol might have been surmounted if the treaty had provided for an
effective arbitration procedure, but it did not do so, with the result that
an awkard stalemate was created and has persisted for the past several
years, encouraging spokesmen for both Japan and the United States
to level angry charges of overreaching, misinterpretation and miscon-
struction, and violation of the spirit if not the letter of the treaty.
By now it should be clear that the debate over the true meaning of
the Tripartite Treaty is so clouded that little can be gained from con-
tinuing the search for this will-o-the-wisp. The question to be con-
fronted is not "What was intended in 1953," but "What is the proper
salmon fishery regime that should be created now?" Looked at in this
light the arguments over the disadvantages and inefficiencies of the
Japanese high seas salmon fishery become less important. The more
important question is whether the Japanese should continue to catch
North American spawned salmon at all, and, if that question is an-
swered in the affirmative, when and where would be the most appro-
priate time and place for them to do so.
Whether the United States can induce the Japanese to leave the
North Pacific salmon fishery entirely is a question that cannot be
decided in this article, or anywhere other than at the bargaining table.
Such a possibility is at least doubtful, however, in view of the strongly
held views of the Japanese as to why they should be entitled to con-
tinue such participation."3 2 What can be usefully done in this writing
is a brief analysis of some of the benefits that might be derived by the
United States and Japan from a new agreement.
Two major benefits worthy of special consideration are: (1) the
establishment of a comprehensive management program which would
control Japanese as well as United States salmon fishing; and (2) the
opportunity through such a management program to build the Alaska
salmon stocks to a higher level, thus increasing total harvest and
providing more salmon for all participants.
' Summarized, the Japanese arguments for continued participation are: (1) the
Japanese can legally continue their high seas salmon fishery under the literal wording
of the Tripartite Treaty; (2) they have the legal power to abrogate the treaty on one
year's notice and expand this fishing even more; (3) the Tripartite Treaty was
essentially written by the United States to protect its own interests and was, to some
extent, pushed on a weak Japan in 1952-53, thus why should the United States object
now to its terms; (4) Japan is much stronger and independent now and has a vocal
public (and socialist party) demanding a larger share of this high seas fishery; (5) a
significant segment of the Japanese fishing industry is now dependent upon the high
seas salmon fishery for its livelihood and it would be unfair to this industry to stop
it; (6) the abstention principle was rejected at Geneva and has not been adopted in
other treaties throughout the world as anticipated in 1953.
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Needless to say, if a new treaty is negotiated a greater effort should
be made to identify goals clearly and completely. If, for example,
the new agreement were to allow the Japanese to share a certain per-
centage of specified North American salmon stocks, then this share,
and its determination under varying conditions, should be carefully
defined and explicitly stated. Also, it should provide for an effective
method of arbitration in the event of later disagreements over treaty
interpretation. Some use might be made of the dispute settlement
principle expressed in article IX of the 1958 Geneva Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea.133 Care-
ful thought should also be given to a method for infusing new scientific
data into the treaty regime so that the problems raised by the am-
biguities in the protocol can be avoided. Certainly "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" should not be used as a criterion for measuring the
probative effect of new data.
One of the more obvious benefits to be sought in a new treaty would
be the inclusion of all fishermen under the management umbrella. At
present the Japanese high seas salmon fishery is not integrated into
the salmon management program and tends to be disruptive of that
program as carried out by the United States. One of the principal
criticisms of the Japanese high seas fishery is that, because of high
seas mixing of various stocks, the Japanese sometimes take too many
fish from one stock, thus cutting into desirable escapement, or cutting
unfairly into the potential catch by United States fishermen. A logical,
albeit politically unpalatable solution to this problem would be to ar-
rive at an estimate of the number of North American salmon the Japa-
nese are going to take in their high seas fishery and then arrange for
them to take these fish nearer to United States shores, closer to the
mouths of spawning streams, in areas and at times determined most
suitable under a comprehensive management regime. The charge of
salmon wastage from gillnet dropouts and predator losses resulting
from the Japanese practice of leaving gillnets in the water too long-
from 6 to 10 hours-and the charge of wastage through the taking of
immature salmon, might be met by bringing the Japanese under a
tighter management program and requiring appropriate changes in
fishing operations. Other illustrations of improvement in resource
management resulting from bringing the Japanese into such a program
could be suggested.
" See 1958 Geneva Convention on Living Resources of the High Seas, art. 9.
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Regardless of who catches the fish, the United States would seem
to be the logical choice for the lion's share of the management respon-
sibility: as between Japan and the United States the latter has had
vastly more experience in salmon management; all the spawning
streams where the counting, collecting, hatching, and water quality
control must occur are inside the borders of the United States, not in
Japan; and the United States has in the past invested enormous sums
in salmon research and continues to do so, whereas the Japanese re-
search investment, both past and present, is on a much smaller scale.
It may be an understatement to suggest that a number of problems
can be anticipated from consideration of the suggestions mentioned
above, not the least of which would be the peaceful management of
two historically hostile groups of fishermen operating in the same
waters. Too much proximity could breed open hostility. It has been
suggested that the recent Japanese investment and participation in the
Alaskan fish canning business may encourage closer cooperation be-
tween Alaskans and Japanese, but there seems to be little evidence of
any such attitude changes at present.
One other benefit that might be derived from a new treaty would be
the more effective exclusion, or at least discouragement, of South
Korea and other current non-participating nations from the salmon
fishery. It seems likely that if Japan, Canada, and the United States
were to settle their differences and agree on a comprehensive manage-
ment program, the existence of such a program would tend to dis-
courage newcomers. Conversely, it will be difficult to persuade new-
comers that high seas salmon fishing is detrimental to the efficient
management of the resource so long as Japan is actively engaged in
such a fishery under a valid and existing treaty.
There seems to be little reason to include the Soviet Union in any
new salmon treaty regime. The present tacit understanding between
the United States and the U.S.S.R. that each should stay out of the
other's salmon fishery works well enough and should be continued if
at all possible. Bringing the U.S.S.R. into the management program
offers few discernible benefits and would only complicate an already
difficult decision-making process."'
Lastly, good salmon management requires long-range planning with
" On the other hand, it has been suggested that if the U.S.S.R. and the United
States were to agree formally to stay out of each other's salmon fishery, they might at
the same time use such an agreement to put greater pressure on the Japanese, South
Koreans, and other foreign fishermen to stay out of these two fisheries.
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the expectation that carefully laid plans and experiments will be car-
ried out. The one-year termination provision in the Tripartite Treaty
jeopardizes this expectation. Thus one goal to be sought in a new
treaty regime would be the commitment of all participating nations to
an extended period of unified management.
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